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  As thought through logic, death is separate from life, ending the finite existence of life. As understood 
through onto-logic, death and life are inseparable, extending through being as the nothingness of death. 
Heidegger recognizes the importance of death, as experienced through the death of the other and as 
impending in the future rather than abiding in the present, but as having no specified relation to 
nothingness. Derrida suggests a relation of death to nothingness by renunciation of the I. For Nishitani, 
nothingness is the key to understanding death; nothingness is at the start and end of every moment 
and on the near side of things. When objectified and separated from life, death is experienced in the 
finitude of death-of-life and death-of-death. However, life-of-death links life to death and nothingness 
of being, making death and life inseparable. Death is involved in life as the constant experience of 
nothingness. 
 
“What’s it like to be dead? It ain’t nothun at all.”  
– Cormack McCarthy, All the Pretty Horses.  
 “Nah, I shook my head, things that come out of 
nowhere go back to nowhere, that’s all.” 
– Haruki Murakami, Pinball. 
 
As a common understanding, the question of what is death has no answer: We 
live and die, period. As McCarthy’s character says, “It ain’t nothun at all,” and as 
Murakami says, its dynamic is a constant coming from and going to nowhere. 
This suggests that death after life is nonexistent and therefore non-experienceable. 
Having no identity as a being or thing and no location in the duration of time or 
distance of space, such death is nothingness, timeless, and spaceless, referring 
only to nothing. Yet death is not just an event or a verb for dying; it is also a noun 
about a state that is usually misunderstood as only non-life, which leads nowhere 
because no one dead is talking.  
But is the nothingness of death also lived? An ontological perspective may 
provide an answer, which may be derived from answering four particular 
                                                     




1. What is the relation of being and nothingness? The relation is one: Being 
is nothingness; nothingness is being. Without nothingness, being would not be 
being; without being, nothingness would not be nothingness. They are inseparable, 
two sides of the same ontological coin, which is an answer presented most 
convincingly not by Western philosophers but by Buddhist philosophers such as 
Keiji Nishitani.  
 
2. What is the relation of being/nothingness and death? Because of the relation, 
death is also in the life of being, and so refers to something more than nothingness 
alone. Furthermore, as being, nothingness always has presence in the present. It 
is not sufficient to say only that death is an anticipation of the future or 
remembrance of the other’s death in the past.  
  
3. What is the relation of being/nothingness and life? Being (as conceived by 
Martin Heidegger and including nothingness) includes all beings of life and non-
life; such being/nothingness is the living and thinking experience of dasein. As 
something thought, being/nothingness is death as well as life. It follows that, while 
death may be the pure, inexperienced nothingness of the death-of-life, it is, also 
and more importantly, the experienced life-of-death. 
 
4. What is the relation of life and death? It is usually considered as life or 
death, whereby the one excludes the other, as indicated by death-of-life. However, 
as with being and nothingness, the relation of life and death makes them 
inseparable and necessary, as indicated by life-of-death, which is an experience 
of dasein.  
 
Given the relations of being, nothingness, life, and death and the distinction 
between death-of-life and life-of-death, we are now positioned to argue that, from 
an ontological perspective, death and life are not separated and opposed. This 
common view of death or life goes back to the famous statement by Epicurus: “If 
I am, then death is not. If I am not, then death is.” This death-of-life view requires 
little elaboration, if accepted prima facie as having no after-life. For better or 
worse, science has demystified the traditional appeal of such notions as soul. The 
mind is an appendage of the brain and body; each idea, however Platonic, 
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scriptural, or epiphanic, requires the electro-chemical activity of the brain as an 
interdependent organ of the body; when body/brain dies, the mind dies as well. 
Death-of-life is final. 
However, the idea of life-of-death opens a new understanding. We turn first 





Heidegger introduces “dasein” as the living thereness of “Being”, the latter 
capitalized to include all things as beings. He starts the second part of Being and 
Time with the subject “Being-towards-death,” which recognizes that death is an 
integral aspect of the temporality of Being, which “is something that stands before 
us, something impending”. 1 This standing-before-us is understood by seeing the 
death of others, and the something-impending while experienced in the present, 
refers to the future hence its not-yet “towardness.” Both ideas lack ontological 
relevance in the presence of the present.  
Regarding the death of others, Heidegger states: “In the dying of the Other 
we can experience that remarkable phenomenon of Being which may be defined 
as a change-over of an entity from dasein’s kind of Being (or life) to no-longer-
dasein.”2 He provides no other way of experiencing no-longer-dasein or learning 
about death in one’s own life. Dasein’s kind of Being evades the experience of 
death itself, not the mere idea of death.  
Regarding “something impending”, Heidegger talks of being-towards-death, 
not about being-as-death or life-of-death. Death itself is a matter of “towardness,” 
an impending not-yet that is anticipated in the future rather than experienced in 
the present. Accepting the fact that the future does not exist except as an idealized 
anticipation, this towardness is an inadequate notion for the death-driven anxiety 
recognized by Kierkegaard, Heidegger himself, and other existentialists. 
Something more present must be involved, namely the experience of death in the 
present, not just the death of the other and not something impending in the future. 
Instead, death is the lived being-as-death; it is the perpetual perishing of living 
                                                     
1 Martin Heidegger, Being and Time, trans. John Macquarrie and Edward Robinson (New York: Harper 
and Row, 1982), p. 294. 
2 Ibid., p. 238. 
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and abiding in the moment, perishing because the present is slipping away into 
the past. This nothingness is not just impending but confronts the very being of 
the present and induces Kierkegaardian anxiety, a point Heidegger makes in his 
essay “What Is Metaphysics?”   
If death is only impending in the future, then dasein does not experience death 
in the present, which is a conclusion explicated by Heidegger: “When dasein 
reaches its wholeness in death, it simultaneously loses the Being of its ‘there’. By 
its transition to no-longer-dasein, it gets lifted right out of the possibility of 
experiencing this transition and understanding it as something experienced.”3 
While losing its thereness, dasein cannot experience death as such: “Dasein never 
perishes. Dasein, however, can demise only as long as it is dying.”4 When dying 
becomes death, not-being-there can no longer reveal the perishing of being-there 
– like Bishop Berkeley’s forest log that cannot reveal its fall in the absence of 
someone being-there. Epicurus expressed the idea more simply: If I am, then 
death is not; if death is, then I am not.  
Dasein losing its “da” remains an interesting idea. Is the end of “da” the end 
of “sein”? By analogy, one can suppose that, when the mind loses its body, the 
mind and everything else ends, especially if one does not believe in life-after-
death. But sein is not necessarily organism-dependent; it is a word designating an 
ontological universal, stressed by Heidegger who capitalizes “Sein” to indicate 
that it does not consist of individual beings alone or as the mere sum of them. 
Furthermore, sein is not explicated as consciousness of a self or I, which gives 
still further credence to Being as a special case that is removed from ordinary 
suppositions of living and dying. As Heidegger puts it, “Being and the structure 
of Being lie beyond every entity and every possible character which an entity may 
possess. Being is the transcendens pure and simple.”5 The point of interest, but 




Derrida mostly agrees with Heidegger. Citing Emmanuel Levinas, Derrida 
agrees with the notion that death is learned primarily from the other: “It is for the 
                                                     
3 Ibid., p. 281. 
4 Ibid., p. 291. 
5 Ibid., p. 62. 
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death of the other that I am responsible, to the point of including myself in death.”6 
Derrida agrees also with the idea of being-toward-death, but here he talks about 
the elephant in the room neglected by Heidegger – namely the individual “I” that 
would do the dying: “I do not end, I never end, I know that I will not come to an 
end.”7 He refers to Heidegger’s ontological mode of demising that cannot be 
experienced by dasein and so makes dasein imperishable for two reasons. First, 
language fails to grasp what death is except as a metaphor or fantasy. Death can 
be known only through language and thought, but it cannot be understood “as 
such,” only as demise, which is neither dying nor perishing.8 Second, since I am 
necessary to know my end but cannot know my end except only as demise, I can 
never end, which leaves an aporia of the ending of knowing and knowing of 
ending (a soteriological condolence of not worrying about what cannot be known). 
I can know my dying only through, as Heidegger argued, “being-toward-death.” 
Dasein can “therefore end without perishing.”9 
Apart from the harbored life of dasein or even the individual I, death remains 
unexamined in Aporia, and Derrida ends with the concession that death is beyond 
borders and demarcations – outside the text, so to speak – yet he probes beyond 
the textual border of being-toward-death by asking how this ending demise can 
be realized. Derrida speaks of trying “to withdraw from death by making the I, to 
whom death is supposed to happen, gradually go away; no, be destroyed before 
death comes to meet it, so that there should be no one left to be scared of losing 
the world in losing himself in it.”10 Derrida concludes, “Here I give myself the 
gift of death.” In place of the dread of being-toward-death, losing the I can be a 
gift as it was for Abraham or Job and his willingness to sacrifice everything to 
God, as discussed in Derrida’s subsequent book The Gift of Death.  
Derrida probes new ontological ground by asking what dasein would be and 
do to live death and be imperishable – not just to live metaphorically as if dead or 
contingently as toward-death (Heidegger), but to live without the individual I or 
self, which requires a renunciation of self-generated desire and attachment. An 
ontology of life without self (anattā) and with nothingness (sunyatā) as its base is 
                                                     
6 Jacques Derrida, Aporias, trans. Thomas Dutoit (Stanford CA: Stanford University Press, 1993), p. 
39. 
7 Ibid., p. 38. 
8 Ibid., p. 37. 
9 Ibid., p. 39. 
10 John D. Caputo, The Prayers and Tears of Jacques Derrida: Religion without Religion (Bloomington: 
Indiana University Press, 1997), p. 302. 
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The question persists: What is the nature of death that could extend beyond 
being-toward-death and experience of the other’s death and that may be part of 
dasein and life itself? Nishitani’s Mahayana Buddhist understanding of 
nothingness provides an answer, which differs from the Western understanding in 
three respects. First, in linking death and nothingness in Religion and Nothingness, 
he draws from Heidegger, although the latter made no such link. The discussion 
of death starting in the second part of Being and Time did not examine nothingness, 
and his main essay on nothingness “What Is Metaphysics?” did not discuss death. 
For Heidegger, dasein was always intact – fully alive, so to speak, even in demise 
– which was a position accepted by Derrida and others. 
Second, the Western understanding that being is already and always pregiven 
makes nothingness relative, as illustrated by the deriving of nonbeing (usually 
equated with nothingness) from being. In “What Is Metaphysics?” Heidegger 
states: “Nothing is the negation of the totality of beings; it is nonbeing pure and 
simple.”11 The “what-is” comes first; only then can negation occur to produce 
nothingness. He refers to Hegel’s prominent statement, “Pure being and pure 
nothing are thus one and the same,” but the latter also starts with the idea of pure 
being that is immediate and indeterminant. 12  Similarly, Sartre says that 
nothingness comes after both consciousness and being: “Consciousness is prior 
to nothingness and is derived from being.”13 A nothingness-as-something results 
from the deliberated action of negation that requires the pregiven being of dasein 
or a deliberating actor. Neither Heidegger, Hegel, nor Sartre entertains the reverse 
idea of Buddhists that the totality of being also may derive from pregiven 
nothingness. 
Third, Eastern thought about nothingness includes no such derivation from 
the primordiality of being. Buddhists view nothingness from the standpoint of 
nihility or the Sanskrit term “sunyatā”, usually translated as emptiness. Suzuki 
argues that emptiness “is what makes relativity possible; emptiness is an intuiting 
                                                     
11 Martin Heidegger, What Is Metaphysics?, trans./ed. David Farrell Krell (London: Harper  
Perennial, 2008 (1929)), p. 97. 
12 Ibid., p. 108. 
13 Jean-Paul Sartre, Being and Nothingness: An Essay on Phenomenological Ontology, trans. Hazel E. 
Barnes (New York: Philosophical Library, 1956), p. lvi. 
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truth whereby we can describe existence as related and multifarious.” He 
reproaches Buddhist and Western scholars who “are content to interpreting it 
(sūnyatā) as relativity or mere nothingness. . . . A true prajna (wisdom) obtains 
only when the dualism of being and nonbeing is transcended.”14 The negation of 
mere nothingness differs from the emptiness or ontological primacy of 
nothingness that is not nonbeing but that is being itself. Most Buddhists agree, for 
example Eugene Herrigel: “The void is just exactly All. It is the every being of 
Being – and it is not; it is just simply Nothing – and it is not.”15 
Nishitani speaks of “traces of the common view that simply sets nothingness 
over against existence as a mere conceptual negation persist. The longstanding 
Western view of nothingness has yet to divest itself of this way of thinking.”16 In 
extending beyond the phenomena of conceptual negation and into the nothingness 
itself, Nishitani points to the example that heat is possible only with non-heat, 
with its absence or nothingness: “To sum up, a hot thing merges into being as what 
it is in itself at a point beyond all categories of substance, quality, quantity, and 
the like – namely, on the field of sunyatā, or absolute nothingness.” 17  For 
Nishitani, nihility as the experience of nothingness is the ground or field of being, 
which was empty before dasein or consciousness attended and intended to it, 
before it was objectified and constructed as something and then identified by what 
it was not. The latter is the phenomenal consequent of consciousness affirming 
and negating, constructing and deconstructing. 
What is the thing of consciousness, as it is constructed as an object? 
Everything experienced has a “near side” and “far side.” Its near side is first 
apprehended in the ground or field or domain of nothingness out of which 
something arises into consciousness; its far side is then identified and constructed. 
The near side is prehended as primary experience, which is what Buddhists call 
suchness or “tathatā”. The far side is prehended as secondary experience of things 
objectified in language and thought. 
Nishitani concludes, “Both being and emptiness are seen as co-present from 
                                                     
14 Daisetz Teitaro Suzuki, Essays in Zen Buddhism, ed. Christmas Humphreys (London: 
Rider and Company, 1972), p. 342. 
15 Eugen Herrigel, The Method of Zen, ed. Hermann Tausend, trans. R.F.C. Hull (New York: Vintage 
Books, 1960), p. 114.  
16 Keiji Nishitani, Religion and Nothingness, trans. Jan Van Bragt (Berkeley: University of Chicago 
Press, 1982), p. 96. 
17 Ibid., p. 127. 
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the start and structurally inseparable from one another. . . . Emptiness is not to be 
posited as something outside of and other than ‘being’. Rather, it is to be realized 
as something united to and self-identical with being.”18 Being and nothingness 
are linked necessarily and interdependently, and most Buddhists believe that 
neither has primordiality over the other. For example, Nagao states: “The phrase 
‘all things are empty’ means that everything is nonexistent.” He adds, “But this 
negation is not mere nothingness. It rather indicates an affirmative absolute being, 
free from objectifications and qualifications.”19 
That said, Nishitani goes on to tie the nihility of nothingness-as-emptiness to 
death: “Death and nihility are equally real. Wherever there are finite beings – and 
all things are finite – there must be nihility; wherever there is life, there must be 
death.”20 This starts with the nihility of nothingness-as-emptiness and concludes 
that death is the only way for life to exist and be experienced. And the reverse is 
also true; wherever there is death, there must be life, a return to the whole of being. 
Dasein’s every moment or other unit of time involves not just a start but an end. 
Being is both perpetual perishing and emerging. This is expressed as “eternal 
recurrence,” borrowed from Nietzsche, and interpreted from the standpoint of 
time and loss of the present in death – “when time becomes a circle, then time 
returns to the home-ground of the present, that moment wherein time itself is 
always present as a single whole. Then all things scattered limitlessly throughout 
time are gathered together again into one.”21  
While indebted to Heidegger, Nishitani goes beyond the idea of “something 
impending” to “being-toward-death” by referring to “the possibility of Being and 
therefore the possibility through which life and all possibility are revealed. Being-
toward-death is being toward one’s ownmost being-able-to-be.” Death and 
nothingness are not impending; they already are there as life and being. 22 
Nishitani advances both “death-sive-life” and “life-sive-death” as an interplay 
between death and life, the “sive” or “of” indicating both the common notion of 
the death of life and the uncommon notion of the life of death.23 The latter is 
                                                     
18 Ibid., p. 97. 
19 Gadjin M. Nagao, Mādhyamika and Yogācāra: A Study of Mahāyāna Philosophies (Albany: State 
University Press of New York Press, 1991), p. 209. 
20 Nishitani, Religion and Nothingness, p. 82. 
21 Ibid., p. 229. 
22 Keiji Nishitani, The Self-Overcoming of Nihilism. trans. Graham Parkes (Albany: State University of 
New York Press, 1990), p. 166. 
23 Nishitani, Religion and Nothingness. pp. 93-94. 
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clearly ontological: As being is possible only with nothingness as its field from 





Nishitani argues that nothingness as well as being permeates existence in the 
world – all identities of things and the three dimensions of time (past, present, 
future) and of space (length, width, breadth). In time, nothingness is before and 
after the somethingness of experience that arises out of nothingness, abides in 
nothingness, and ceases back into nothingness. In space at a given time, 
nothingness is on the near side of things while abiding in experience; identified 
things are not what they are – the “not” comes with the “are”. Logically speaking, 
non-being negates being and being affirms non-being, as death negates life and 
life affirms death. But ontologically speaking especially in accordance with 
Eastern thinking, neither negates nor affirms the other. As being and nothingness 
are wrapped around one another, life and death are wrapped around one another, 
symbolized by the Chinese Taijitu.  
Nothingness is no more primordial and foundational to being than being is 
primordial to nothingness. Materially speaking, nothingness appears most 
prominent. It constitutes most of the material being of matter and energy; even 
the atoms of matter are 99 percent empty space. Living existence is not in a state 
of being-there as in Western thinking but rather a state of nothing-there in Eastern 
thinking. And existence is, ontologically speaking, very largely nothing at a given 
time, and in time it comes from, abides in, and returns to the nothingness 
emphasized by Nishitani.  
Nishitani’s central theme for nothingness is no-self or anattā, which is not 
peculiar. Whereas self is lauded in contemporary society, it usually is rejected in 
perennial philosophy and theology. Jesus’ entreaty in Luke (Bible, 9:23) is well 
known: “If any man would come after me, let him first deny himself.” Meister 
Eckhart stated that, to join God, one must work “to reduce the self to 
nothingness.”24 Chung Tsu says the perfect man has no self. Noted above is 
Derrida’s I that can go away and lose itself in the world.    
But the most systemic treatment of no-self is in Buddhism, starting with the 
                                                     
24 Meister Eckhart, Meister Eckhart: A Modern Translation, trans. Raymond B. Blakney (New York: 
Harper and Row, 1941), p. 23. 
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Buddha (1917: 48) whose first words upon his enlightenment are: “I have 
obtained deliverance by the extinction of self.” Later, the Buddha states, “Self is 
death . . . The cleaving to self is a perpetual dying.”25 As the self is a perpetual 
dying, so the non-self is living. The death of self provides a nothingness or 
emptiness for an open involvement in life and liberation from suffering. Nishitani 
speaks of “absolute nothingness or emptiness that would break through this self-
attachment and deny the self-centered prehension of personality.”26 He deems 
this possible because an I or self is not a stationary and verifiable subject – not the 
thinker of what is thought, not the seerer of what is seen, etc. He rejects Descartes’ 
claim to doubt because the I must exist as a cogitating ego to have doubt. What 
am I is impossible to say; the I can be known only through its effects as a 
hypothetical construct. With the I nihilated, Nishitani puts forth the Great Doubt: 
“It is the moment at which self is at the same time the nothingness of self, the 
moment that it is the ‘locus’ of nothingness where conversion beyond the Great 
Doubt takes place. For the Great Doubt always emerges as the opening up of the 
locus of nothingness.”27  
To cope with the nothingness of death, the task is to abandon the illusory self 
or I. Most Buddhists, especially in the Mahayana tradition, nihilate the self to 
attain emptiness or nothingness, disattachment, and the state of nirvana, which 
applies to other selves even as admonished by Rinzai: When you see the Buddha, 
kill him. Again, this is not peculiar to Buddhism. Bertrand Russell sees the 
possibility of subordinating the personal self into a universal identity to overcome 
the fear of death and “to make your interests gradually wider and more impersonal, 
until bit by bit the walls of the ego recede, and your life becomes increasingly 
merged in the universal life.” 28  Or, as said by Roy Baumeister, “The most 
effective solution to this threat (of death) is to place one’s life in some context that 
will outlast self.”29 The Hindus denigrate the self in favor of sadguru, which is 
the perfect, undifferentiated guru that has become one with divine and cosmic 
consciousness. The liberation of nothingness starts with the annihilation of self. 
 
                                                     
25 Buddha, The Gospel of Buddha, ed. Paul Carus (Chicago IL: Open Court Publishing, 1917), p. 153. 
26 Nishitani, Religion and Nothingness, p. 95. 
27 Ibid., p. 21. 
28 Bertrand Russell, “How To Grow Old,” Portraits from Memory and Other Essays (New York: George 
Allen, 1956), p. 50. 
29 Stephen Cave, Immortality: The Quest To Live Forever and How It Drives Civilization (London: 




Selfless nothingness involves the life-of-death, which is death experienced as 
the infinitude of being/nothingness, which is distinct from the finitude of the life-
of-death. The latter involves a self-exercised negation of life and death as the 
commonly understood. While analytically distinct, the two are experienced in 
degrees of emphasis; even the saint or guru will experience dying, to some degree, 
as the finitude of death-of-life. Organs and muscles atrophy; cells die; each breath 
is a loss; a little dying each day gone irretrievably into nothingness. As life is the 
emergence of living form, death is its disintegration. Matter is still conserved in 
accordance with the first law of thermodynamics; even resulting ashes and gases 
have form. Such facts of dying are experienced as the death of life, yet at the same 
time everything lives and dies infinitely at each moment for all time, from 
particles to universes, from prokaryotes to humans. 
Both death-of-life and life-of-death are lived dasein. They are lived not in the 
no-more of the past and not-yet of the future, but in the here-now experience of 
the present, and on the near side of the present from which experience originates. 
Thus Nishitani may speak of the inseparable unity of life and death: “Although 
contrary opposites in their natures and conceptually distinguishable as such, life 
and death make themselves present to us not as separate things but rather as one 
inseparable unity in which there is full distinction without any separation 
whatsoever. . . . The essential inseparability – the ‘absolute oneness’ – of 
essentially contradictory elements, such as life and death, cannot be understood 
without giving heed to their nonobjective character.” 30  Life/death cannot be 
objectified and separated; they constitute lived being/nothingness. 
Another Buddhist understanding is the merging of samsara (the cycle of life) 
and nirvana (the cessation of strife). Abe comments: “We are always living and 
yet always dying at every moment. Without living, there is no dying; without 
dying, there is no living. Living and dying are non-dualistically one in our 
existential realization.”31 This realization leads to the “Great Death” in which the 
discontinuity of samsara (the cycle of life) is overcome by the continuity of 
nirvana (the cessation of strive). Therefore, “Samsara and nirvana are identical.”32 
                                                     
30 Nishitani, Religion and Nothingness, p. 289. 
31 Masao Abe, Zen and Western Thought (Honolulu: University of Hawaii Press, 1985), p. 165. 
32 Ibid., p. 166. 
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So understood, the ontology of nothingness does not involve the logic of 
negation and the construction/deconstruction of existence. Non-life and non-
being are not ontological extensions; they are logical and dualistic negations of 
lives and beings. When Hamlet raises the question of “To be or not to be,” he 
should be saying, “To exist or not to exist,” albeit clumsy poetry. He is not 
speaking of being as such but rather of his existence that is negated by death as 
non-life and of life-or-death. He is speaking logically about his existence as a 
being and not ontologically about being and life-of-death as such.  
In an existential and biological sense, we are alive or dead, but in an 
ontological sense, we are alive and dead. We may speak biologically of death or 
life, which reflects the finitude of existence marked by identity, temporal duration 
and spatial distance, which contrasts with the unmarked infinitude of being and 
nothingness. The ontological relation of “and” involves more than the “or” 
relation.  
Being/nothingness is necessary for existence. It is the empty slate upon which 
is written the entities and forms of existence; it is Nishitani’s ground of “ultimate 
reality” that is empty, free of attachment, and realized in nirvana. Or, it is like 
Plato’s khôra or receptacle that, itself without form and existence, is a universal 
recipient and holder of existence; or like the being of Lao Tzu’s dao from which 
all things emanate and to which they return; or the Hindu understanding of 
Brahman. Such notions are consistent with Heidegger’s point that Being 
transcends beings that exist as identities in space/time.  
While existence requires being/nothingness, does being/nothingness require 
existence? Can “sein” be without “da” and empty of “thereness”? Many things 
seem to have an autonomous being; while existing as ideas, their meaning 
transcends actual or even virtual experience – for example, Plato’s eternal ideas, 
Aristotle’s substance, many subsequent notions of substance and essence, as 
suggested by universals that transcend particulars and require no particulars for 
their universality. “1+2=3” simply is; regardless of the forms of existence that 
change over time and space and regardless of whether three particular things exist, 
one-plus-two will always equal three. Such universals seem to have being without 
existence, to have “sein” without “da”.  
The idea of life-of-death recognizes the transcendence of being. Life exists in 
nothingness or emptiness of being, which occurs with every breathing moment 
that comes from emptiness and goes back to the same and which can be realized 
by the annihilation of the I/self. Nishitani adds that emptiness and life-of-death 
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are experienced immediately on the near side – starting with no Heideggerian 
“they”, no Christian sin, no Buddhist karma or attachment, no Tillichian finitude 
or boundaries of physical space or time. With self, body, and mind not yet to come 
or already gone, we live, so to speak, in pure being. We are not just finite beings 
but also part of infinite Being, with a transcending consciousness the realization 
of which includes a kind of cosmic presence.  
 
DEATH-OF-DEATH   
 
Life-of-death is not the so-called death-of-death, which is a dramatized 
absurdity of death-of-life. Referring to Jean-François Loytard, John Caputo 
speaks of “death pure and simple, the death of death-as-part-of-life. This death of 
death does not mean immortality, which is the way theologians like to blunt the 
point; it means there is nothing living left to die. . . . A million, million, million 
years from now, we’ll just be cinders.” With the extinction of the human race and 
solar system, he exclaims, “If that’s not nihilism, nothing is!”33  
But cinders and gases do remain, as recognized in the biblical coping of ashes 
to ashes long before cosmological speculation about cosmic nihilism and as 
recognized in energy and matter conserved in accordance with the thermodynamic 
law of conservation. From the final destruction of the solar system will come yet 
another solar system. Star stuff and information are not nihilated, not even in black 
holes as now acknowledged by Stephen Hawking. The sun’s matter and energy 
will remain, and in another four billion years or so will disintegrate to form still 
another solar system. As to the universe itself, no one knows. It could fly apart 
into a void of entropy, which gives Caputo reason to dismiss cosmic religion as 
hopeless. Or it could be within or beside other universes, another reason to dismiss 
cosmic religion as hopelessly unknowable. Or, it could be recyclable and its own 
raison d’être, a hopeful and knowable cosmos that lives eternally. These are the 
three current scenarios, but until things such as dark energy are better understood, 
no one can know. 
Does any kind of death matter more or less? For us at our biological death, all 
of it is gone anyway, unless we take comfort in religions of a here-after. The 
universe (now 92 billion light years across and expanding) can hardly be mindful 
that this moment of human existence on a single planet and star among billions 
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would involve any noteworthy loss. Our being, our cultural and technological 
civilization is not the point. It does matter to realize that, while here and living, 
from a universal or cosmic viewpoint, matter and energy go on creating, 
destroying, and recreating different systems and forms. Such is the essence of the 
Cosmic Religion of Einstein and those who followed him such as Carl Sagan and 
Stephen Hawking.  
The universe probably was never made or meant for us. We cannot know its 
primal origin or final purpose even assuming a god-like maker or indeed even 
with a maker mindful of us. We have to make ourselves for the universe, which 
starts with understanding and accepting total Being, from the unfathomable 




Soteriological practice can be as revealing about death as can ontological 
analysis; in fact, the two are complementary. Through his meditations Descartes 
was able to analyze the cogito required for his being, a practice common in his 
day for philosophical as well as theological insight. Setting aside the desires and 
preconceptions of self or ego is a practice in modern science as well as philosophy. 
But Buddhists simply take such setting aside absolutely (which is not a matter of 
degree like Zeno’s arrow never quite arriving but rather is complete, ground-zero 
clearing that leads to nothingness/being). They admonish the practice of 
discarding self, body, mind and its thoughts, and not just to understand death but 
to dispel suffering about death. The aim is to kill the self to be free to live. When 
asked what is death, Seung Sahn replied, “You are already dead,” and goes on to 
equate death with emptiness: “This ‘No’ is no self, no other, no body, no mind, no 
world. So it is no life and no death. This is true emptiness.”34 Or, the Buddhist-
inclined Catholic, Thomas Merton: “In order to live, I have to die.” 35  The 
Catholic theologian Richard Rohr: “You must seek to be a blank slate. / You must 
desire to remain unwritten upon. / No choosing of this or that.” 36  The 
postmodernist theologian John Caputo: “We should live as if we did not live. . . 
We should live without allowing any of the beliefs and practices that are the 
                                                     
34 Seung Sahn, Dropping Ashes on the Buddha, ed. Stephen Mitchell (New York: Grove Press, 1976), 
p. 91. 
35 Thomas Merton, New Seeds of Contemplation (New York: New Directions Books, 1961), p. 47. 
36 Richard Rohr, The Naked Now (New York: Crossroad Publishing, 2009), p. 174. 
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accidents of birth to block the deeper involvement of faith in life.”37 The Stoic 
Marcus Aurelius: “Consider yourself to be dead and to have completed your life 
up to the present time; then live out according to nature the remainder which is 
allowed you. Now take what’s left and live it properly.”38  
The point is that, by living dead, a motley group of Western thinkers and 
Buddhists use practice to clear away the troubling attachments to existence and 
open the way to the experience of nothingness/being, much like the finding of 
being in the opening of the forest extolled by Heidegger. Yet the falling away of 
mind as well as body and self is a distinctive Buddhist canon, introduced by the 
Buddha and perhaps best illustrated by Rujing’s teaching to Dogen: “Zen study is 
a matter of shedding mind and body.”39 Bankei says that the Buddha Mind is 
“unborn and marvelously illuminating” and the same for everyone as “the One 
Identical Buddha Mind.”40 Being united as one for everyone, the Buddha Mind 
was never born and so can never die; it is the mirrored universe of being for all 
Buddha Minds.  
The question arises: If self, body, and mind fall away, what is left of the 
existence and being of the world? What does it mean, ontologically, to live in the 
death of nothingness or emptiness? The answer is suggested in Montaigne’s 
famous statement: To philosophize is the learn how to die. This can involve two 
views. First, by having no biological being of living and dying or no body or 
material presence, we would forgo human desire, Epicurean and otherwise, 
something Marius the Epicurean could not do despite his admiration for the 
stoicism of Aurelius. We would struggle to be a disembodied spirit, lifeless and 
sacrificial. From the human standpoint of living body and senses, even of 
consciousness, we would be nothing and nonexistent, hollowed as well as 
hallowed.  
The other view presented here – namely emptiness as a liberating or freeing 
from the finitude of existence to prehend the totality of being/nothingness. In 
contrast to the Western view that nothingness would be the disembodied agony of 
nihilism, the Eastern view has emptiness as the nirvana of nonattachment and 
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freedom. Whether regarded as privation or liberation, renunciation aims at the 
particular exemplifying the universal, the part to the whole, singular to the 
universal. Through the practice of renunciation, the finite appearance of existence 
can access the infinite presence of being. Being/nothingness can be experienced 




As thought through logic, death is opposed to life, closing the finite existence 
of life. As understood through onto-logic, death and life are inseparable, opening 
the infinitude of being that is inseparable from nothingness.  
Heidegger recognized the ontological importance of death, especially 
regarding temporality, but viewed death as experienced through the death of the 
other and as impending in the future rather than abiding in the present. Derrida 
asked what dasein would be without the individual I or self, an answer of which 
requires a renunciation of self-generated desire and attachment. For Nishitani, 
nothingness or emptiness is being and is at the start and end of every experienced 
moment, at the near side of things as they first appear from emptiness, experienced 
in the present. Living existence or dasein is not in a state of being-there as in 
Western thinking but rather a state of nothing-there in Eastern thinking that makes 
being possible. 
When objectified and separated from life, death is experienced in the finitude 
of death-of-life and death-of-death. Distinguished from death-of-life and death-
of-death, life-of-death links life to death and the nothingness of being, making 
death and life inseparable and necessary. Death is involved in life as the constant 
experience of nothingness.  
Soteriologically speaking, with the dropping of self, body, and mind, the life-
of-death brings transcending meaning to the experience of life and to the 
ontological understanding of death. Life-of-death can be experienced as infinite 
being/nothingness, particularly with the renunciation of the finite existence of self, 
body, and mind. 
